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In this paper we study the single-leg revenue management problem, with no information given about
the demand trajectory over time. The competitive ratio for this problem has been established by Ball and
Queyranne (2009) under the assumption of independent demand, i.e., demand for higher fare classes does not
spill over to lower fare classes. We extend their results to general demand models to account for the buying-
down phenomenon, by incorporating the price-skimming technique from Eren and Maglaras (2010). That
is, we derive state-dependent price-skimming policies, which stochastically increase their price distributions
as the inventory level decreases, in a way that yields the best-possible competitive ratio. Furthermore, our
policies have the benefit that they can be easily adapted to exploit available demand information, such as the
personal characteristics of an incoming online customer, while maintaining the competitive ratio guarantee.
A key technical ingredient in our paper is a new “valuation tracking” subroutine, which tracks the possible
values for the optimum, and follows the most inventory-conservative control which maintains the desired
competitive ratio.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider the single-leg revenue management problem, where a firm is selling
multiple products that share a single capacity over a finite time horizon. The price of each product
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2and the unreplenishable starting capacity are exogenously determined. The firm’s objective is to
maximize its total revenue earned, by dynamically controlling the availability of different products
over time. The tradeoff lies between “myopic” controls which maximize the immediate revenue at
a point in time, and “conservative” controls which ration capacity for the remaining time horizon.
The motivating application for this problem lies in airlines, where each flight leg has a limited
seat capacity, and the products correspond to different “fare classes” (e.g. economy, business) which
offer seats at different prices. The seat capacity and fare classes have been determined long in
advance, through factors such as business strategy, positioning, competition, etc. The time horizon
is finite, ending upon the flight’s departure.
We study this problem in the setting where very limited information is given or can be learned
about demand. This setting was introduced by Ball and Queyranne (2009), Lan et al. (2008), where
meaningful controls can be derived based on only the knowledge of the fare class prices. The authors
consider booking limit policies, which can be described as follows. Initially, all of the fare classes
are made available to customers. Once the total seat sales surpasses a critical threshold, the lowest
fare becomes unavailable. Progressively higher fares are made unavailable until the flight either
becomes full or takes off.
An important assumption made in the model of Ball and Queyranne (2009) is that demand for
the different fare classes is independent. That is, although the lower fares are made available until
their booking thresholds are reached, there is no risk of cannibalizing the sales of higher fares.
The justification for this assumption in the literature is two-fold. First, the fare classes have been
designed to segment customers and achieve price discrimination, i.e. the perks provided by business
class dissuade price-insensitive business travelers from having interest in lower-class fares. Second,
these business travelers tend to book last-minute, i.e. by the time they book the lower-class fares
have usually become unavailable anyway.
However, marketplace and technology changes have introduced environments where these jus-
tifications may no longer hold. For example, the competition from low-cost carriers (e.g. Spirit
3Airlines) has forced major airlines (e.g. United Airlines) into adopting more overlapping fare family
structures (e.g. adding a “basic economy” fare which competes with the regular economy fare).
Also, the advent of e-commerce has brought a significant increase in customer sophistication, as well
as the firm’s understanding of customers via “big data” analytics. The motivation of this paper is
to derive advanced booking controls which rely on dynamic price-changing infrastructure instead of
the independence assumption to differentiate between customers with different willingness-to-pay.
1.1. Model and Results
Throughout this paper, we analyze the “critical” case where customers always substitute to the
lowest available fare. In Section 6, we explain why this is sufficient to allow for any setting where
customers substitute according to a random-utility choice model.
In this critical case, the problem reduces to a dynamic pricing problem. We can describe each
customer using a valuation, or maximum willingness-to-pay. At each point in time a single price is
offered, and customers who encounter that price make a purchase if and only if it does not exceed
their valuation. (Offering multiple prices is redundant, because the lower price would always be
chosen over the higher price.)
We let P denote the set of fare class prices, which are the feasible prices to charge. The starting
capacity comes in the form of k discrete units of inventory. The selling horizon consists of T discrete
time steps, which are sufficiently granular such that at most one customer arrives during each time
step. We let Vt denote the maximum price in P that the customer in time t is willing to pay, which
is 0 if no customer arrived. An online algorithm must sequentially choose a price Pt for each time
t, and if Vt ≥ Pt, then revenue Pt is earned and one unit of inventory is depleted.
In settings where no information is given about the sequence of valuations, an online algorithm
is evaluated by comparing its total revenue earned on different sequences to that of a clairvoyant
optimum. For any sequence V1, . . . , VT , the offline optimum OPT(V1, . . . , VT ) is defined as the
maximum revenue that could have been earned from knowing all the valuations in advance, equal
to the k largest values in V1, . . . , VT . For c≤ 1, if an online algorithm can guarantee that its revenue
4is at least c · OPT(V1, . . . , VT ) on every sequence V1, . . . , VT , then it is said to be c-competitive.
If c is best-possible in that any (potentially randomized) online algorithm cannot simultaneously
guarantee greater than c ·OPT(V1, . . . , VT ) revenue over all sequences V1, . . . , VT , then c is called
the competitive ratio.
In the model of Ball and Queyranne (2009), the competitive ratio for any problem instance is
shown to be a function of only the price set P, which we will denote using c∗(P). Their model
corresponds to ours when each Vt is deterministic and given at the start of time t. The decision
at time t then reduces to an accept-reject decision, where accepting customer t corresponds to
charging her maximum willingness-to-pay of Vt, and rejecting customer t corresponds to charging
any price above Vt (possibly ∞ if the inventory has run out). Ball and Queyranne (2009) derive
c∗(P)-competitive booking limit policies which specify when to reject customers paying low prices.
In this paper, we derive c∗(P)-competitive online algorithms under the following models with
progressively less information:
1. Vt is deterministic and given at the end of time t (Section 2). This model includes the case
where the airline has a point estimate of Vt at the start of time t, but does not use it in
determining the price Pt, because the airline wants to refrain from “personalized pricing”.
2. Vt is stochastic and distributionally-given at the end of time t (Section 3). In this model,
the airline estimates a conditional distribution of the customer’s valuation Vt falling into the
different fare classes, by using the arrival patterns of different fare classes as well as the
customer’s response to being offered price Pt.
3. No information on Vt is ever given (Section 4).
All of these algorithms are best-possible. Indeed, since an online algorithm cannot be better than
c∗(P)-competitive under the model of Ball and Queyranne (2009), an online algorithm also cannot
be better than c∗(P)-competitive under our models with less information.
Our algorithms use the price-skimming technique of Eren and Maglaras (2010), who analyze how
the price of an item should be distributed (e.g. across stores, across time) when the price set P is
5known but demand is completely unknown. Their model corresponds to ours when the inventory
constraint is irrelevant (e.g. when k ≥ T ), in which case they show that the competitive ratio
is also c∗(P). Our work shows how the price-skimming distribution should depend on inventory
when it is relevant. More specifically, our algorithm determines the optimal path-dependent pricing
distribution for each time step t, conditional on the amount of remaining inventory. Interestingly,
our algorithm has the following feature: at any time step, the price distribution which maximizes
the competitive ratio is strictly stochastically-decreasing in the amount of remaining inventory (see
Section 2.4). In fact, this is analogous to a classical structural property when the demand sequence
is known or distributionally-known: at any time step, the price which maximizes the expected
revenue is strictly decreasing in the amount of remaining inventory (Gallego and Van Ryzin 1994,
Zhao and Zheng 2000).
Finally, in Section 5, we consider the personalized online revenue management setting where
the distribution of each Vt becomes available at the start of time t, and this information can
(and should) be used in determining the offering to customer t. Introduced by Golrezaei et al.
(2014), this setting has a very practical motivation of e-commerce, where purchase probabilities
are estimated for each customer based on her personal characteristics (e.g. Mac users have a higher
chance of buying business-class flights). Although our algorithms from Sections 2–3 focus on the
setting without personalized pricing, we show in Section 5 that our algorithms can be naturally
adapted to exploit personal information. The adapted algorithms maintain the competitive ratio
of c∗(P), which is best-possible even with personalized information, since c∗(P) is best-possible
under the setting of Ball and Queyranne (2009) where each customer’s personal valuation is known
deterministically.
1.2. Sketch of Techniques, and Comparison with Existing Techniques
The main technical contribution behind our results is a new “valuation tracking” procedure which
incorporates both booking limits and price-skimming. We motivate it using the following example,
under the model where each valuation Vt is deterministic and revealed at the end of time t. The
6price set is P = {1,2,4}, and we will refer to customers with these valuations as being of type-L
(Low), type-M (Medium), and type-H (High), respectively.
The competitive ratio for this price set derived by Ball and Queyranne (2009) and
Eren and Maglaras (2010) is c∗(P) = 1/2, and we describe below their respective 1/2-competitive
policies.
• Booking Limits (Ball and Queyranne 2009): Initially charge $1; increase the price to $2 after
1/2 of the starting inventory has been sold; further increase the price to $4 after 3/4 of the
starting inventory has been sold. (This is the variant of booking limits with “theft nesting”.)
• Price-skimming (Eren and Maglaras 2010): Charge $1 for 1/2 of the time steps; charge $2 for
1/4 of the time steps; charge $4 for 1/4 of the time steps.
We now discuss what happens if we try to implement these policies under our model.
Attempt 1: Direct implementation of booking limits. It is easy to see that this would not
be 1/2-competitive—suppose just one type-H customer arrived at the start. The algorithm would
be charging the low price of $1, while the offline optimum would be the customer’s valuation of $4.
Any direct implementation of price-skimming would suffer similarly, since there could be a single
type-H customer who arrives during a time when the price is set to $1.
Attempt 2: Price-skimming as a randomized price. It appears that the problem with
Attempt 1 can be solved using the “random price” interpretation of price-skimming—instead of
deterministically partitioning the time horizon according to ratios 1
2
, 1
4
, 1
4
and offering prices 1,2,4
respectively, one could at each time step choose the prices randomly with respective probabilities
1
2
, 1
4
, 1
4
. Then, if a single type-H customer arrives, the expected revenue would be
1
2
· 1+
1
4
· 2+
1
4
· 4 = 2
which is 1/2 of the customer’s valuation of $4. It can be checked that 1/2 of the customer’s valuation
is also earned when it is $1 or $2; this is by construction of the price-skimming distribution.
However, having a fixed price-skimming distribution is no longer effective under inventory con-
straints. Indeed, if a long sequence of type-L customers arrive, then this would deplete the inventory
7with high probability, and type-H customers who arrive last-minute would not be served, and the
ratio of optimum earned would again be 1/4.
Attempt 3: Naive incorporation of booking limits into price-skimming. It appears
that the problem with Attempt 2 can be solved by respecting the booking limits, i.e. forbidding
price-skimming from randomly choosing the price of $1 after 1/2 of the starting inventory has been
sold. However, this still fails to be 1/2-competitive, as shown by the following example. Suppose
the starting inventory is 4, and that 2 type-H customers arrive followed by a type-L customer, with
no customers arriving after that. The optimum would be $9. However, the algorithm’s revenue
would only equal $4: it would earn $2 in expectation from each of the type-H customers, depleting
2 units of inventory, and then earn $0 from the type-L customer due to the booking limit.
Our procedure: Valuation tracking. The problem with Attempt 3 leads to the following
observation—the optimum is guaranteed to increase from the first 4 customers (since there are
4 units of inventory), so in order to be 1/2-competitive, the algorithm must maintain the initial
price-skimming distribution for the first 4 customers. After that, the algorithm can respect booking
limits as long as customers rejected in this way would not increase the optimum, and in fact should
do so, to avoid the problem in Attempt 2 of stocking out. This motivates our procedure below.
• Valuation Tracking: At each time t, let ℓt denote the smallest value (possibly 0) in the 4 largest
valuations to have arrived before time t (since 4 is the starting inventory). Then, randomly
choose the price in a way such that the algorithm’s expected revenue during time t is equal to
1
2
(Vt− ℓt), for any Vt > ℓt. (1)
Vt − ℓt is the gain in the offline optimum should the valuation of customer t be Vt, and 1/2
is the desired competitive ratio. The constraint that the algorithm’s revenue is exactly equal
to (1) effectively forces it to use the most inventory-conservative controls which maintains 1/2-
competitiveness, thereby hedging against a stockout. The price distribution used at each time t
depends on the inventory state, and in fact, the calculation for the algorithm’s expected revenue
8must account for the probability of stocking out before time t. The surprising fact is that it is
possible to choose price distributions which collectively guarantee (1).
We illustrate our basic valuation tracking procedure in Section 2.1 by “stacking” the past valua-
tions in a geometric configuration, and formalize it in Section 2.2. The basic procedure is designed
to have a clean analysis and we consider variants in Sections 2.3–2.4, as well as generalize it to the
stochastic-valuation model in Section 3.2. A unique challenge arises in Section 3.3, where we use
sampling to convert a c∗(P)-competitive valuation tracking procedure with exponential runtime
into a (c∗(P)− ε)-competitive procedure with polynomial runtime.
1.3. Related Work
Single-leg revenue management is a cornerstone problem in the area of revenue management and
pricing, as outlined in the book by Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006). Many different approaches for
modeling demand have been considered over the years, as surveyed in Araman and Caldentey
(2011), den Boer (2015). In contrast to other approaches, which optimize based on a forecast of
future demand (Gallego and Van Ryzin 1994, Zhao and Zheng 2000), learn an unknown demand
function (Besbes and Zeevi 2009), or learn in various Bayesian (Araman and Caldentey 2009,
Chen and Wu 2016) and minimax (Lim and Shanthikumar 2007, Zhang et al. 2016) settings, com-
petitive ratio analysis is a form of minimax analysis that operates without demand information.
Our work extends the notion of booking limits from Ball and Queyranne (2009) to allow for
non-independent demand, by incorporating the price-skimming of Eren and Maglaras (2010).
We should point out that our “random price” interpretation of price-skimming originated from
Bergemann and Schlag (2008). Randomization is a powerful technique for improving the competi-
tive ratio of online algorithms; for further background we refer to the book by Borodin and El-Yaniv
(2005).
Motivated by e-commerce, the competitive ratio has also been recently studied in many “per-
sonalized recommendation” settings (Golrezaei et al. 2014, Chen et al. 2016, Ma and Simchi-Levi
92017, Cheung et al. 2018). In these papers, there are multiple commodities (“legs”) and inter-
changeability in which commodities are offered to each customer. Our paper differs from these
papers in two ways. First, we do not rely on personalized controls, and instead derive a global
price-skimming distribution, which is useful for online retailers who choose not to engage in person-
alized pricing. Also, even when personalization is desired, we show in Section 5 how to effectively
use personalized information in the single-leg case, and obtain a competitive ratio c∗(P) which is
greater than the multi-leg competitive ratio from Ma and Simchi-Levi (2017).
Finally, while we analyze the problem of inventory-constrained dynamic pricing throughout
this paper, our results easily generalize to the dynamic assortment setting, as explained in the
conclusion (Section 6) of this paper. Our techniques prescribe the best-possible trade off between
revenue maximization and inventory consumption (see Maglaras and Meissner (2006)) when there
is a single flight leg, known fare classes, but general unknown demand.
2. Deterministic Valuations
In this section we consider the problem defined in Section 1.1 under the model where each cus-
tomer’s valuation is deterministic and revealed immediately after she leaves.
First we define some additional notation to that defined in Section 1.1. For any positive integer
n, let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}. For notational convenience, we will assume that P consists of
m discrete prices, i.e. P = {r(j) : j ∈ [m]}, sorted 0 < r(1) < . . . < r(m). All of our results can be
generalized to the case where P is a continuum of prices taking the form [rmin, rmax], as we discuss
in Section D. We define r(0) to be 0, and then the valuation Vt at any time t lies in r
(0), . . . , r(m),
with Vt = r
(0) representing the lack of a customer during time t. Similarly, we define r(m+1) to be
∞, and then the price Pt at any time t lies in r
(1), . . . , r(m+1), with Pt= r
(∞) representing the firm
shutting off demand during time t, which is the only option if its inventory is out of stock. Let Xt
be the indicator variable for making a sale during time t, i.e. it is 1 if Vt ≥Pt, and 0 otherwise.
Let T denote the number of time steps. None of the algorithms in this paper assume any knowl-
edge of T ; note that T can always be made arbitrarily large by inserting customers with valuation 0.
10
We will hereafter treat T as the unknown total number of customers, and use the phrase “customer
t” to refer to valuation Vt (even if it is 0).
An online algorithm must choose each Pt based on the history of past prices and valuations,
P1, V1, . . . , Pt−1, Vt−1. This history also determines the values of X1, . . . ,Xt−1. The online algorithm
does not know T , and has no information about Vt, Vt+1, . . . , VT , when choosing Pt. In contrast, the
offline optimum knows the entire sequence V1, . . . , VT before having to choose any prices. Given any
valuation sequence V1, . . . , VT , we use the Pt and Xt variables to refer to the execution of an online
algorithm on the valuation sequence. Since the online algorithm may be randomized, we treat Pt
and Xt as random variables. Let ALG(V1, . . . , VT ) denote the total revenue earned by the online
algorithm, equal to
∑T
t=1PtXt. Then E[ALG(V1, . . . , VT )] is its expected revenue. Meanwhile, let
OPT(V1, . . . , VT ) denote the offline optimum for sequence V1, . . . , VT , equal to the min{k,T} largest
valuations from V1, . . . , VT . Formally, an online algorithm is said to be c-competitive if
E[ALG(V1, . . . , VT )]≥ c ·OPT(V1, . . . , VT ), ∀ T ≥ 1, (V1, . . . , VT )∈ (P ∪{0})
T . (2)
We will omit the arguments (V1, . . . , VT ) in ALG and OPT when the context is clear.
As explained in Section 1.1, since our problem captures the problems of both Ball and Queyranne
(2009) and Eren and Maglaras (2010), an upper bound for the value of c in (2) is given by c∗(P),
as defined below.
Definition 1. For any m≥ 1, 0< r(1) < . . . < r(m), and P = {r(1), . . . , r(m)}, define:
• q(j) = 1− r
(j−1)
r(j)
for all j ∈ [m] (recall that r(0) = 0);
• q=
∑m
j=1 q
(j);
• c∗(P) = 1
q
.
The interpretation of q(j) in Ball and Queyranne (2009) is the fraction of initial inventory “set
aside” for prices j and higher. The interpretation of q(j) in Eren and Maglaras (2010) is the fraction
of time that price j should be charged. Both of the papers establish that the competitive ratio
cannot be better than c∗(P) via Yao’s minimax principle (Yao 1977). Therefore, for any fixed
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(but possibly randomized) online algorithm in our problem, there exists a sequence V1, . . . , VT such
E[ALG(V1, . . . , VT )] ≤ c
∗(P) · OPT(V1, . . . , VT ). In this paper we derive various c
∗(P)-competitive
algorithms, using our valuation tracking procedure as the core subroutine.
2.1. Intuition behind Valuation Tracking Procedure
The goal of our basic procedure is to, for each customer, earn a constant fraction c∗(P) of the gain
in OPT from that customer arriving, which would imply being c∗(P)-competitive. To accomplish
this, it tracks the current value of OPT, i.e. the sum of the k largest valuations to have arrived
thus far, which are assumed to be known.
Consider an example where the feasible price set is P = {1,2,4}, in which case c∗(P) = 1
2
. Suppose
the starting inventory is k = 5, and that 5 customers, with valuations 4,1,4,1,2, have already
arrived. The current value of OPT is then the sum of these 5 valuations, 4+1+4+1+2= 12.
The procedure considers the possibilities for the increase in OPT from the next customer, which
we denote as ∆OPT. Since the smallest valuation currently counted toward OPT is 1, if the valua-
tion of the next customer if 4, then ∆OPT= 3; if it is 2, then ∆OPT=1. If the next customer has
valuation not exceeding 1, then ∆OPT = 0. The procedure wants to guarantee that its expected
revenue on the next customer is at least 1
2
·∆OPT, for all of these possible valuations. To accom-
plish this, it has to consider the probability that it has stocked out at this point; on those sample
paths its revenue is 0.
Our procedure cleanly accounts for the probability of stocking out using the following approach.
Each customer is assigned to a specific unit of inventory i∈ [k] upon arrival. Each inventory unit i
maintains a variable level[i], which is the maximum valuation of a customer previously assigned
to it. The next customer is always assigned to an unit i∗ with the smallest value of level[i∗],
regardless of whether that unit i∗ has already been sold. In this way, the assignment procedure is
deterministic, and allows us to maintain an invariant: the probability a unit i has been sold is
dependent on only the (deterministic) value of level[i].
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1
2
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inventory unit i
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Valuation
Figure 1 The configuration of valuations, before and after a customer with valuation 2 arrives.
For each customer, the procedure makes an offer to her only if unit i∗ has not been sold, at a
random price exceeding level[i∗]. The higher level[i∗] is, the more likely it is that unit i∗ has been
sold, and the lower the expected revenue from that customer. However, if level[i∗] is high, then the
potential increase in OPT from that customer is also lower; if the valuation of the customer does
not exceed level[i∗], then both the procedure’s revenue and ∆OPT are 0. By properly choosing
the distributions for the random prices, our procedure is able to maintain the invariant on the
probability of each unit being sold, while earning 1
2
·∆OPT in expectation from each customer.
Returning to the example, given that the first 5 customers had valuations 4,1,4,1,2, the values
of level[i] for i= 1, . . . , k are shown in the LHS of Fig. 1. The next customer, “customer #6”, is
assigned to inventory unit 2. After her valuation is revealed to be 2, the updated configuration is
shown on the RHS of Fig. 1, regardless of whether she was rejected.
Customer #6 would have been rejected if unit 2 was sold before her arrival, even if other units
were available. When P = {1,2,4}, the probability that a unit i has been sold equals 0, 1
2
, 3
4
,1 if
level[i] is 0,1,2,4, respectively. These probabilities correspond to the values of q(j) from Defini-
tion 1. Since level[2] was 1 before customer #6 arrived, she is made an offer with probability
1
2
, at a random price exceeding 1. The price is 2 with probability proportional to 1
4
, and 4 with
probability proportional to 1
4
(again using the values of q(j)), hence each price would be offered
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Algorithm 1: Valuation Tracking Procedure
Input: Customers t= 1,2, . . . arriving online, with each valuation Vt revealed after the price
Pt is chosen.
Output: For each customer t, a (possibly random) price Pt for her.
1 level[i] = 0,sold[i] = false for i=1, . . . , k;
2 t= 1;
3 while customer t arrives do
4 i∗t =argmini level[i];
5 set ℓt to the index in {0, . . . ,m} such that level[i
∗
t ] = r
(ℓt);
6 if sold[i∗t ] = false then
7 offer price r(j) with probability q
(j)
∑m
j′=ℓt+1
q(j
′)
, for all j = ℓt+1, . . . ,m;
8 else
9 reject the customer by choosing price ∞;
10 end
11 observe valuation Vt and purchase decision Xt;
12 level[i∗t ] =max{level[i
∗
t ], Vt};
13 if Xt =1 then
14 sold[i∗t ] = true;
15 end
16 t= t+1;
17 end
with probability 1
2
. The customer’s valuation is 2, so she will only buy the item if offered price 2,
which occurs with total probability 1
2
· 1
2
= 1
4
. Note that:
1. Customer #6 increases the probability of unit 2 being sold from 1
2
to 3
4
, which is consistent
with her increasing level[2] from 1 to 2;
2. Customer #6 increases the value of OPT, equal to
∑k
i=1 level[i], by 1 (from 12 to 13);
3. Customer #6 brings in expected revenue 1
4
· 2 = 1
2
.
Therefore, during time step 6, our procedure has earned expected revenue 1
2
·∆OPT. We will show
that it achieves this for a general P, and all time steps t, regardless of the valuation of customer t.
2.2. Valuation Tracking Procedure and Analysis
We now formalize our valuation tracking procedure, in Algorithm 1.
In line 7, the procedure offers exactly one of the prices r(ℓt+1), . . . , r(m), with the offering proba-
bilities summing to unity. Note that it cannot branch to line 7 if ℓt =m. This can be seen in the
following way. If ℓt =m, then i
∗
t must have been assigned to some past customer t
′ with Vt′ = r
(m).
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At time t′, either inventory unit i∗t was already sold, or customer t
′ was offered a price at most
r(m), which she would have accepted. In either case, sold[i∗t ] must be true.
The analysis of Algorithm 1 is conceptually simple. Let bi,t be the index in 0, . . . ,m such that
level[i] = r(bi,t) at the end of time t, and jt be the index such that Vt = r
(jt). We show that the
following claims are maintained:
1. At the end of each time step t, the probability that any inventory unit i has been sold is
(
∑bi,t
j=1 q
(j))/q;
2. During a time step t, if the valuation of the customer exceeds the level of the inventory unit
she is assigned to, i.e. jt> ℓt, then:
(a) The expected revenue earned by Algorithm 1 is 1
q
(r(jt)− r(ℓt));
(b) The increase in the offline optimum is r(jt)− r(ℓt).
If jt ≤ ℓt during a time step t, then both the revenue of Algorithm 1 and the gain in OPT are 0.
These claims establish the following theorem, whose full proof is deferred to Section A.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 is c∗(P)-competitive.
2.3. Modified Algorithm based on Valuation Tracking Procedure
In this section we present a modified version of Algorithm 1 which is useful for the subsequent
developments under the stochastic-valuation model in Section 3.
First we show how to modify Algorithm 1 so that its decision at each time t depends on only
the remaining inventory, instead of the entire history of purchase decisions X1, . . . ,Xt−1.
Definition 2. For all t= 0, . . . , T , let It denote the random variable for the amount of remaining
inventory at the end of time t, which is equal to k−
∑t
t′=1Xt′ .
Our modified algorithm makes an offer to customer t according to the probability that unit i∗t
hasn’t been sold, conditioned on the realized value of It−1. In this way, its decisions depend on only
the inventory state, instead of the exact decisions of past customers.
15
Definition 3 (Algorithm 1’). Define the following algorithm for choosing the price at each
time t, based on the past valuations V1, . . . , Vt−1 and the amount of remaining inventory It−1.
1. Consider the indices i∗t and ℓt during iteration t of Algorithm 1, which are deterministic based
on V1, . . . , Vt−1.
2. Compute the probability that sold[i∗t ] = true on a run of Algorithm 1, conditioned on It−1
units of inventory remaining after time t− 1 in that run. Let γt denote this probability.
3. With probability γt, make an offer to customer t with the same price distribution as Algo-
rithm 1 (line 7); with probability 1− γt, reject customer t.
Algorithm 1’ chooses the distribution for Pt by “averaging” over all runs of Algorithm 1 which
have the same value of It−1. We first remark that this can be done in polynomial time, despite
there being exponentially many sample paths for Algorithm 1. We prove the following in Section B.
Lemma 1. The value of γt in Step 2 of Algorithm 1’ can be computed in polynomial time.
We now introduce some notation to disambiguate between random variables depicting the runs
of different algorithms.
Definition 4. For an algorithm A, let PAt , X
A
t , and I
A
t be the random variables for the price
at time t, purchase decision at time t, and inventory remaining at the end of time t, respectively.
Let ALGA be the random variable for the total revenue earned by algorithm A. We will omit the
superscripts A when the context is clear.
Let A=A1 refer to Algorithm 1 and A=A1′ refer to Algorithm 1’.
We show that Algorithms 1 and 1’ are virtually the same in that they have identical distributions
for the remaining inventory at each time step, as well as the random price at each time step
conditioned on any value of remaining inventory. This also establishes that Algorithm 1’ is feasible,
in that it does not try to make a sale with zero remaining inventory.
Lemma 2. For all t ∈ [T ], k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that Pr[IA1
′
t−1 = k
′] > 0, and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m,m + 1},
Pr[P A1
′
t = r
(j)|IA1
′
t−1 = k
′] = Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′].
Also, for all t= 0, . . . , T and k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k}, Pr[IA1
′
t = k
′] = Pr[IA1t = k
′].
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Lemma 2, proven in Section B, is a consequence of the design of Algorithm 1’. For all t, the
random price P A1
′
t is identically distributed as P
A1
t , conditional on any value for the amount of
remaining inventory at the end of time t−1. Hence if IA1
′
t−1 and I
A1
t−1 are identically distributed, then
so are IA1
′
t and I
A1
t . This allows us to inductively establish that the two algorithms have the same
aggregate behavior after combining all sample paths, even though their behavior may differ given
a specific history of purchase decisions. This also makes it easy to see that the expected revenues
of the two algorithms are the same. Lemma 2 directly implies the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1’ is c∗(P)-competitive.
2.4. Further Modified Algorithm and Structural Properties
In this section we present a further-modified version of Algorithm 1’ which satisfies two structural
properties: (i) it never rejects a customer if it has remaining inventory, offering the maximum price
instead; (ii) the distribution of prices offered to a customer is strictly stochastically-decreasing (see
Corollary 1) in the amount of remaining inventory. Property (ii) is the stochastic analogue of the
classical structural result from Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994, Thm. 1) and its generalization to
non-homogeneous demand in Zhao and Zheng (2000, Thm. 3): at any time step, if the firm has
more inventory, then the optimal offering price is strictly lower.
Definition 5 (Algorithm 1”). Define the following modification to Algorithm 1’: in Step 3,
offer price the maximum price r(m) to customer t, instead of rejecting her, with probability 1− γt.
We prove the following general lemma, which is intuitively easy to see, in Section B.
Lemma 3. Let A be any pricing algorithm. Let A′ be the modified algorithm which: whenever A
would reject a customer while there is remaining inventory, A′ offers price r(m) instead. Then on
any valuation sequence V1, . . . , VT , E[ALG
A′ ]≥E[ALGA].
Lemma 3 shows that Algorithm 1” is c∗(P)-competitive. Now, we would like to further show
that the probability of Algorithm 1’ rejecting, or correspondingly the probability of Algorithm 1”
offering the maximum price, is smaller when conditioned on larger values of remaining inventory.
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Theorem 3. Suppose that the unconditional probability of Algorithm 1’ rejecting customer t,
Pr[sold[i∗t ] = true], lies in (0,1). Then for any k1 < k2 with Pr[It−1 = k1]> 0 and Pr[It−1 = k2]> 0,
Pr[sold[i∗t ] = true|It−1 = k1]>Pr[sold[i
∗
t ] = true|It−1 = k2].
This structural property is intuitive, and we defer its proof to Section B. Theorem 3 allows us
to conclude with the following corollary about strict stochastic dominance.
Corollary 1. For any t, suppose k1 < k2 with Pr[It−1 = k1] > 0,Pr[It−1 = k2] > 0, and let
FPt|It−1(x|k1), FPt|It−1(x|k2) denote the CDF’s of the price Pt offered by Algorithm 1” at time
t conditional on the remaining inventory It−1 being k1, k2, respectively. Then FPt|It−1(x|k1) ≤
FPt|It−1(x|k2) for all x ∈ R, and moreover, the dominance is strict in that FPt|It−1(x|k1) <
FPt|It−1(x|k2) for some price x∈P.
3. Stochastic Valuations
The model with stochastic valuations differs from the model with deterministic valuations studied
in the previous section in the following ways. The valuation of each arriving customer is now
randomly drawn from some probability distribution. The valuations of different customers are
independent, but not necessarily identically distributed. An online algorithm is given the valuation
distribution for each customer after the price for that customer has been chosen.
Definition 6. We use the following notation, defined for all t:
• Vt: the valuation of customer t, a random variable taking values in {r
(0), r(1), . . . , r(m)};
• vt: the probability vector (v
(0)
t , v
(1)
t , . . . , v
(m)
t ) for the distribution of Vt, with v
(j)
t =Pr[Vt = r
(j)]
and
∑m
j=0 v
(j)
t =1;
• Vt: (V1, . . . , Vt), the vector of realized valuations up to time t;
• PAt : (P
A
1 , . . . , P
A
t ), the vector of prices up to time t chosen by algorithm A.
We now provide a justification for our choice of offline optimum in our definition of competitive-
ness and competitive ratio, where in (2) we have replaced OPT(V1, . . . , VT ) with its expected value
(and the values of Vt are realized independently).
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3.1. Discussion of the Offline Optimum with Stochastic Valuations
The weakest (least clairvoyant) offline benchmark one could compare against with stochastic val-
uations is the following. Consider an offline algorithm which is given the sequence of valuation
distributions, v1, . . . ,vT , in advance. Given this sequence, it can solve for the policy which max-
imizes expected revenue, using dynamic programming. Clearly, the expected revenue of such a
policy is an upper bound on the expected revenue obtainable by an online algorithm.
However, such a benchmark is difficult to compare against, because the optimal policy knowing
v1, . . . ,vT , while computable in polynomial time, may not admit any structure. Therefore, we relax
the offline optimum by allowing the offline algorithm to know the realizations of all the valuations
V1, . . . , VT in advance. The optimal algorithm knowing such information then has a trivial structure
(sell to the k largest valuations).
In line with the definition from Section 2, let OPT(V1, . . . , VT ) denote the sum of the k largest
valuations in V1, . . . , VT . We define the competitive ratio with stochastic valuations to be
sup
ALG
inf
v1,...,vT
E[ALG(v1, . . . ,vT )]
EV1∼v1,...,VT∼vT [OPT(V1, . . . , VT )]
. (3)
In (3), the algorithm designer first commits to a (potentially randomized) algorithm ALG, after
which an adversary chooses the sequence v1, . . . ,vT , which determines the expected revenue of the
online algorithm. The offline optimum is defined to be the expected value of OPT(V1, . . . , VT ) where
V1, . . . , VT are realized according to v1, . . . ,vT . We note that such an expected value cannot be
computed in polynomial time; it is related to computing the expected project duration in a PERT
network with independent task durations, which is #P-hard (Hagstrom 1988). Also, we should
note that the definition of competitive ratio in (3) is equivalent to the following definition:
sup
ALG
inf
v1,...,vT
E
[
ALG(v1, . . . ,vT )
OPT(V1, . . . , VT )
]
which is a general fact in competitive ratio analysis (Krumke 2002).
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Finally, we should point out that a different relaxation in the offline optimum is possible, originat-
ing from Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994); see also Talluri and Van Ryzin (2006). Given the valuation
distributions, v1, . . . ,vT , one can write the following Deterministic Linear Program (DLP):
max
m∑
j=1
r(j)
T∑
t=1
x
(j)
t Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)] (4)
m∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
x
(j)
t Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]≤ k
m∑
j=1
x
(j)
t ≤ 1 t∈ [T ]
x
(j)
t ≥ 0 j ∈ [m], t ∈ [T ]
Let OPTLP(v1, . . . ,vT ) denote the optimal objective value of the LP (4) where the value of each
Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)] is computed based on vt. It can be shown that OPTLP(v1, . . . ,vT ) is an upper bound
on the expected revenue of the optimal dynamic programming policy knowing v1, . . . ,vT , since x
(j)
t
encapsulates the unconditional probability of the policy offering price j to customer t.
Nonetheless, in this paper we don’t compare against OPTLP(v1, . . . ,vT ), which appears to be too
strong of an offline benchmark. We show that the competitive ratio of c∗(P), which was optimal in
our deterministic setting, can still be achieved with stochastic valuations under definition (3). In
other words, allowing the offline optimum to know the realizations of V1, . . . , VT does not decrease
the competitive ratio. On the other hand, allowing the offline optimum to use the fractionality of
the DLP (4) does decrease the competitive ratio; we provide some examples in Section E.
3.2. Optimally-Competitive Algorithm with Exponential Runtime
Having established our offline benchmark, we now derive c∗(P)-competitive algorithms in the
stochastic-valuation model. We do so by using our valuation tracking procedure as a subroutine,
in a similar way to the development in Section 2.3, which may be helpful to reference.
Conceptually, our algorithm is a generalization of Algorithm 1’ to stochastic valuations. However,
since the assignment procedure in Algorithm 1 is no longer deterministic, we describe the algorithm
in a different way. At a time step t, given v1, . . . ,vt−1 and k
′:
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1. Consider a run of Algorithm 1 to the end of time t, where V1, . . . , Vt−1 are randomly drawn
according to v1, . . . ,vt−1. For all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m,m+1}, compute Pr[P
A1
t = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′], where
the probability is over both the random valuations and the random prices chosen by the
algorithm. (If Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′] has measure 0, then choose price r(m+1).)
2. For each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m,m+1}, choose price r(j) with probability Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′].
Let Exp denote this algorithm, and we will use the corresponding notation from Definition 4.
It will be seen that Exp is a feasible policy when we establish that IExpt and I
A1
t are identically
distributed. First expand the expression Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′] as follows:
Pr[P A1t = r
(j) ∩ IA1t−1 = k
′]
Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′]
=
∑
PA1
t−1,Vt−1:I
A1
t−1=k
′
Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|PA1t−1,Vt−1] ·Pr[P
A1
t−1 ∩Vt−1]
∑
PA1
t−1,Vt−1:I
A1
t−1=k
′
Pr[PA1t−1 ∩Vt−1]
. (5)
In (5), the probability Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|PA1t−1,Vt−1], which conditions on a fixed history
P A11 , V1, . . . , P
A1
t−1, Vt−1, is defined by lines 6–10 of Algorithm 1. Thus, calculating (5) requires enu-
merating all histories that result in IA1t−1 = k
′.
Unfortunately, at each time step t, this takes time exponential in t. The computational dif-
ficulty arises because the assignment procedure in Algorithm 1 is no longer deterministic, as it
was throughout Section 2. For now, we ignore computational constraints and focus on obtaining
an c∗(P)-competitive online algorithm; in Section 3.3 we show how to use sampling to achieve
polynomial runtime while only losing ε in the competitiveness.
The following lemma is analogous to Lemma 2 and proved in Section C.
Lemma 4. For all t∈ [T ], k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k} such that Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′]> 0, and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m,m+1},
Pr[P Expt = r
(j)|IExpt−1 = k
′] = Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′]. (6)
Also, for all t= 0, . . . , T and k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k},
Pr[IExpt = k
′] = Pr[IA1t = k
′]. (7)
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Lemma 4 establishes that Exp is a feasible policy, i.e. it does not try to make a sale with no
inventory remaining. Having established this, it remains to prove that Exp is optimally competitive.
Theorem 4 is proved in Section C.
Theorem 4. E[ALGExp(V1, . . . , VT )] = E[ALG
A1(V1, . . . , VT )]. By Theorem 1, ALG
A1(V1, . . . , VT ) =
1
q
OPT(V1, . . . , VT ) for all realizations (V1, . . . , VT ). Therefore, Exp is c
∗(P)-competitive.
We should point out that although Exp does not inherit the polynomial-time property from
Algorithm 1’, it does inherit the structural property of the price at any time being stochastically-
decreasing in the amount of remaining inventory. This is immediate from Theorem 3, which holds
conditioned on any realization of V1, . . . , VT .
Also, note the following. P Expt and P
A1
t are only guaranteed to be identically distributed when
averaged over all the sample paths up to time t− 1 such that the total remaining inventory is
k′. They may not be identically distributed when conditioned on a specific purchase sequence
X1, . . . ,Xt−1 such that
∑t−1
t′=1Xt′ = k−k
′, or a specific valuation sequence V1, . . . , Vt−1. Nonetheless,
our method works in general. For example, if valuations were correlated, then we would condition
on both It−1 and V1, . . . , Vt−1. One benefit of conditioning on only It−1 in the independent case is to
limit the state space, which is necessary for our polynomial-time sampling algorithm in Section 3.3.
3.3. Emulating the Exponential-runtime Algorithm using Sampling
In this section we show how to “emulate” Exp, using sampling, to achieve a polynomial runtime.
First we provide a high-level overview of the challenges and the techniques used to overcome them.
The intrinsic difficulty is that our original procedure is based on tracking the value of the offline
optimum, but this becomes a #P-hard problem when the optimum equals the expected value of
the k largest elements from independent realizations (see Hagstrom (1988)).
To overcome this using sampling, suppose we are at the start of time t, with inventory k′
remaining. If we randomly sample a run of Algorithm 1 (drawing valuations randomly) such that
IA1t−1 = k
′, and copy price P A1t for time t, then we would match the probabilities prescribed in (5).
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This motivates the following algorithm: sample runs of Algorithm 1 to the end of t−1 until hitting
one where IA1t−1 = k
′, and then choose the price for time t according to lines 6–10 of Algorithm 1.
Such an algorithm is equivalent to Exp, and thus would be c∗(P)-competitive.
However, on sample paths where Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′] is small, the sampling could take arbitrarily long.
We limit the number of sampling tries so that the algorithm deterministically finishes in poly-
nomial time, and show that the total measure of sample paths which fail at any point is O(ε).
Unfortunately, there could be correlation between the sampling failing, and having high revenue
on a sample path. Nonetheless, we can couple the sample paths of the sampling algorithm to those
of the exponential-time algorithm, mark the first point of failure on each sample path, and bound
the difference in revenue after that point.
The details of the sampling algorithm, which we will call Samp, are specified in Algorithm 2.
In line 12, C is a positive integer to be chosen later. The decision of what to do when the sampling
fails, i.e. defaults to line 13, is inconsequential, since in our analysis we do not expect any revenue
from a sample path after the first point of failure.
To bound the revenue of Algorithm 2, we consider an algorithm which behaves identically to
Algorithm 2, except even when it defaults to line 13, it is able to behave as if the sampling succeeded
and makes the same decisions as lines 7–10. Such an algorithm is equivalent to Exp, and hereafter
we will refer to it as Exp. The results of the sample runs do not affect the outcome of the algorithm,
but help with bookkeeping.
Definition 7. Let F Sampt be the indicator random variable for the sampling in Algorithm 2 failing
at time t, defined for all t ∈ [T + 1]. Let F SampT+1 = 1 deterministically. Analogously, let F
Exp
t be the
indicator random variable for the sampling in Exp “failing” at time t, ∀t∈ [T +1].
For convenience, here we will use different random variables to denote the valuations in the runs
of Samp and Exp: V Sampt and V
Exp
t , respectively. We will also use the notation from Definition 4.
Definition 8. Define the history up to time t to consist of realizations up to and including the
sampling at time t. Formally, for all t∈ [T +1], let ht = (f1, p1, v1, . . . , ft−1, pt−1, vt−1, ft), where:
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Algorithm 2: Weakly Randomized Online Algorithm based on Inventory Remaining
Input: Customers t= 1,2, . . . arriving online, with each valuation distribution vt revealed
after the price Pt is chosen.
Output: For each customer t, a (possibly random) price Pt for her.
1 inventory= k;
2 t= 1;
3 while customer t arrives do
4 repeat
5 run Algorithm 1 to the start of time t, with valuations V1, . . . , Vt−1 drawn according to
v1, . . . ,vt−1, and prices P
A1
1 , . . . , P
A1
t−1 realized according to the random prices chosen
by Algorithm 1;
6 if IA1t−1 = inventory then
7 choose each price r(1), . . . , r(m), r(m+1) according to the probability that Algorithm 1
(on this run) would choose that price for customer t;
8 observe vt;
9 observe purchase decision of customer t and update inventory accordingly;
10 t= t+1 and continue to next iteration of while loop;
11 end
12 until C(k+1)t2 runs elapse;
13 choose price ∞;
14 t= t+1;
15 end
• ft′ ∈ {0,1}, for all t
′ ∈ [t];
• pt′ is a price in {r
(1), . . . , r(m), r(m+1)}, for all t′ ∈ [t− 1];
• vt′ is a valuation in {r
(0), r(1), . . . , r(m)}, for all t∈ [t− 1].
Furthermore, define the following vectors of random variables for all t∈ [T +1]:
• HSampt = (F
Samp
1 , P
Samp
1 , V
Samp
1 , . . . , F
Samp
t−1 , P
Samp
t−1 , V
Samp
t−1 , F
Samp
t );
• HExpt = (F
Exp
1 , P
Exp
1 , V
Exp
1 , . . . , F
Exp
t−1, P
Exp
t−1, V
Exp
t−1, F
Exp
t ).
Now, we would like to partition the sample paths by the history up to the first point of failure,
and prove that the two algorithms behave identically up to this point.
Definition 9. Let Ft denote the histories up to time t such that the first failure in the sampling
occurs at time t. Formally, for all t ∈ [T +1], Ft is the set of ht = (f1, p1, v1, . . . , ft−1, pt−1, vt−1, ft)
such that f1 = . . .= ft−1 = 0 and ft= 1. (p1, . . . , pt−1 and v1, . . . , vt−1 are arbitrary, and thus |Ft|=
(m+1)2(t−1).)
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Lemma 5. For a run of Algorithm 2,
⋃T+1
t=1
⋃
ht∈Ft
{HSampt = ht} is a set of mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive events. Analogously, for a run of Exp,
⋃T+1
t=1
⋃
ht∈Ft
{HExpt = ht} is a set of
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events.
Furthermore, Pr[HSampt =ht] = Pr[H
Exp
t = ht], for all t∈ [T +1] and ht ∈Ft.
Lemma 5 is straight-forward, so we defer its proof to Section C. Having proved it, we can write:
E[ALGSamp] =
T+1∑
t=1
∑
ht∈Ft
E[ALGSamp|HSampt = ht]Pr[H
Samp
t = ht] (8)
E[ALGExp] =
T+1∑
t=1
∑
ht∈Ft
E[ALGExp|HExpt = ht]Pr[H
Exp
t = ht]. (9)
Since we also know that Pr[HSampt = ht] = Pr[H
Exp
t = ht], our goal is to compare the expected
revenues of the two algorithms conditional on each history ht ∈Ft.
When t= T +1, i.e. the sampling never fails, it is easy to see that the two revenues are equal.
Indeed, for any hT+1 ∈FT+1:
E[ALGSamp|HSampT+1 = hT+1] = E
[ T∑
t=1
P Sampt ·1(V
Samp
t ≥ P
Samp
t )
∣∣∣HSampT+1 = hT+1]
=
T∑
t=1
pt ·1(vt≥ pt)
= E[ALGExp|HExpT+1 = hT+1]. (10)
Lemma 6. Recall that E[OPT(V1, . . . , VT )] is the expected value of the offline optimum with
V1, . . . , VT drawn independently according to v1, . . . ,vT . For t≤ T and ht ∈Ft,
E[ALGExp|HExpt = ht]−E[ALG
Samp|HSampt = ht]≤E[OPT(V1, . . . , VT )], (11)
Proof. Consider any t∈ [T ] and ht ∈Ft. We have
E[ALGSamp|HSampt = ht] ≥ E
[ t−1∑
t′=1
P Sampt′ ·1(V
Samp
t′ ≥ P
Samp
t′ )
∣∣∣HSampt = ht]
=
t−1∑
t′=1
pt′ ·1(vt′ ≥ pt′). (12)
Meanwhile, E[ALGExp|HExpt = ht] can be decomposed into
t−1∑
t′=1
pt′ ·1(vt′ ≥ pt′)+E
[ T∑
t′=t
P Expt′ ·1(V
Exp
t′ ≥P
Exp
t′ )
∣∣∣HExpt = ht]. (13)
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We elaborate on the second term in (13). Clearly,
∑T
t′=tP
Exp
t · 1(V
Exp
t ≥ P
Exp
t ) cannot exceed the
sum of the min{k,T − t + 1} largest valuations to appear during t, . . . , T , which we denote by
OPT(V Expt , . . . , V
Exp
T ). Furthermore, the random valuations V
Exp
t , . . . , V
Exp
T are independent of the
history HExpt up to time t, so we can remove the conditioning and upper-bound (13) with
t−1∑
t′=1
pt′ ·1(vt′ ≥ pt′)+E[OPT(V
Exp
t , . . . , V
Exp
T )]. (14)
The expectation in (14) is with respect to V Expt , . . . , V
Exp
T being drawn independently according to
vt, . . . ,vT . (14) in turn is no greater than
∑t−1
t′=1 pt′ · 1(vt′ ≥ pt′) + E[OPT(V
Exp
1 , . . . , V
Exp
T )], where
the random variables V Exp1 , . . . , V
Exp
t−1 are not conditioned on the event H
Exp
t = ht. The proof of the
lemma concludes by comparing this expression with (12). 
Substituting (10), for hT+1 ∈ FT+1, and (11), for h1, . . . ,hT ∈ F1, . . . ,FT , into (8) and (9), we
conclude that
E[ALGExp]−E[ALGSamp]≤E[OPT] ·
( T∑
t=1
∑
ht∈Ft
Pr[HSampt = ht]
)
. (15)
By Definition 9, the expression in parentheses is the total probability of the sampling failing at
any point, before choosing the final price P SampT . We bound the term for each t∈ [T ] separately. As
t increases, the number of samples increases, so the probability of failure decreases:
Lemma 7. For all t∈ [T ],
∑
ht∈Ft
Pr[HSampt = ht]≤
1
eCt2
.
Proof. Consider any t∈ [T ]. For all ht ∈Ft, let G(ht) = (f1, p1, v1, . . . , ft−1, pt−1, vt−1), which is
the vector of the first 3(t−1) entries in ht. Let G
Exp
t−1 = (F
Exp
1 , P
Exp
1 , V
Exp
1 , . . . , F
Exp
t−1, P
Exp
t−1, V
Exp
t−1), which
is a vector of 3(t− 1) random variables.
We can write
∑
ht∈Ft
Pr[HExpt =ht] as
∑
ht∈Ft
Pr[F Expt = 1|G
Exp
t−1 =G(ht)]Pr[G
Exp
t−1 =G(ht)]. (16)
Now, for each ht ∈Ft, Pr[F
Exp
t = 1|G
Exp
t−1 =G(ht)] is the probability that all C(k+1)t
2 indepen-
dent runs of Algorithm 1 fail to match the inventory remaining at the start of time t according to
ht. For convenience, define I(ht) = k−
∑t−1
t′=1 1(vt′ ≥ pt′). Then
Pr[F Expt =1|G
Exp
t−1 =G(ht)] = (1−Pr[I
A1
t−1 = I(ht)])
C(k+1)t2 , (17)
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where IA1t−1 is the total inventory remaining at the start of time t in a run of Algorithm 1.
Therefore, we can partition the ht in Ft by I(ht). For all k
′ ∈ {0, . . . , k}, define ρt,k′ =Pr[I
A1
t−1 = k
′].
The following can be derived by substituting (17) into (16):
∑
ht∈Ft
Pr[HExpt =ht] =
k∑
k′=0
(1− ρt,k′)
C(k+1)t2
∑
ht∈Ft:I(ht)=k′
Pr[GExpt−1 =G(ht)]
≤
k∑
k′=0
exp(−ρt,k′C(k+1)t
2)
∑
ht∈Ft:I(ht)=k′
Pr[GExpt−1 =G(ht)]. (18)
At this point, we would like to argue that
∑
ht∈Ft:I(ht)=k′
Pr[GExpt−1 = G(ht)]≤ Pr[I
Exp
t−1 = k
′]. To
see this, note that
∑
ht∈Ft:I(ht)=k′
Pr[GExpt−1 =G(ht)] = Pr[I
Exp
t−1 = k
′ ∩ (F Exp1 = . . .=F
Exp
t−1 = 0)].
Applying the second statement of Lemma 4, we see that Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′] = ρt,k′ . Substituting into
(18), the following can be derived:
∑
ht∈Ft
Pr[HExpt = ht] ≤
k∑
k′=0
ρt,k′ exp(−ρt,k′C(k+1)t
2)
≤
k∑
k′=0
1
C(k+1)t2
exp(−1)
=
1
eCt2
.
The second inequality holds because for a single ρt,k′ ∈ [0,1], the function ρt,k′e
−ρt,k′C(k+1)t
2
is
maximized at ρt,k′ =
1
C(k+1)t2
. The proof of the lemma is now complete. 
It now follows easily that the sampling algorithm is within ε of being optimally competitive.
Theorem 5. For all ε > 0, if we set C = ⌈ 6
eπ2ε
⌉ in line 12 of Algorithm 2, then it is ( 1
q
− ε)-
competitive, and has runtime polynomial in 1
ε
, k, T , and m.
Theorem 5 is straight-forward and proved in Section C.
4. No Information on Valuations
In this section we discuss whether it is possible for an online algorithm to be c∗(P)-competitive
without any information (before or after, deterministic or distributional) on the valuations.
First we show that this is impossible for any online algorithm which price-skims independently,
i.e. realizes its random price at each time step using an independent source of random bits.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that either: (i) m≥ 2 and valuations can be 0 (as usual); or (ii) m≥ 3
and valuations cannot be 0. (Recall that m is the number of prices.) Then for any online algorithm
where each Pt chosen independently based on the sales history X1, . . . ,Xt−1, there exists a sequence
V1, . . . , VT such that
E[ALG(V1, . . . , VT )]
OPT(V1, . . . , VT )
< c∗(P).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let the starting inventory k=1.
First, it is easy to see that if the distribution of P1 is not such that Pr[P1 = r
(j)] = q
(j)
q
for all
j ∈ [m], then for some deterministic instance consisting of a single valuation in {r(1), . . . , r(m)},
E[ALG]
OPT
will be strictly less than 1
q
. Therefore we can without loss of generality assume that Pr[P1 =
r(j)] = q
(j)
q
for all j ∈ [m] (regardless of whether valuations can be 0).
Now suppose m≥ 3. Consider the distribution of P2 conditioned on X1 = 0. If Pr[P2 ≥ r
(m)|X1 =
0] = 1, then consider the instance T = 2, V1 = 1, V2 = r
(m−1). OPT= r(m−1), which exceeds 1, since
m ≥ 3. Meanwhile, qE[ALG] = q 1
q
< OPT. On the other hand, if Pr[P2 ≥ r
(m)|X1 = 0] < 1, then
consider the instance T = 3, V1 = V2 = r
(m−1), V3 = r
(m). OPT = r(m). qE[P1X1] = r
(m−1), while
E[X1] = 1 −
q(m)
q
. The best case for the algorithm, given that V2 = r
(m−1), is P2 = r
(m−1) when
P2 < r
(m). Let Pr[P2 = r
(m−1)|X1 = 0] = α, which we know is positive. In this case, qE[P2X2] =
r(m−1)αq(m) and E[X2] = α
q(m)
q
. Hence qE[P3X3] is at most qr
(m)(1−E[X1+X2]) = r
(m)(1−α)q(m).
All in all, qE[ALG] is at most
r(m−1)+ r(m−1)α(1−
r(m−1)
r(m)
)+ r(m)(1−α)(1−
r(m−1)
r(m)
) = r(m)+α(2r(m−1)−
(r(m−1))2
r(m)
− r(m))
= r(m)−
α
r(m)
(r(m)− r(m−1))2
The term getting subtracted is non-zero since α> 0 and r(m) > r(m−1). Therefore, qE[ALG]<OPT.
This completes the proof when m≥ 3, since c∗(P) = 1/q.
The case where m= 2 and valuations can be 0 is argued analogously. If Pr[P2 ≥ r
(2)] = 1, then
consider the instance T = 2, V1 = 0, V2 = r
(1). If Pr[P2 < r
(2)] = 1, then consider the instance T =
3, V1 = V2 = r
(1), V3 = r
(2). In both cases, it can be seen that qE[ALG]<OPT, completing the proof
of Proposition 1. 
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However, we show that it is possible to be c∗(P)-competitive if the online algorithm can price-
skim in a “coordinated” fashion, with the same probabilities as in Eren and Maglaras (2010).
Proposition 2. Consider the following random-fixed-price policy:
1. Initially, choose a random price P which is equal to each r(j) with probability q(j)/q;
2. Offer price P as long as there is remaining inventory.
This policy is c∗(P)-competitive.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any realization of the valuations, V1, . . . , VT . Iteratively define
the following quantities, for j from m down to 1:
n(j) =min
{ T∑
t=1
1(Vt = r
(j)), k−
m∑
j′=j+1
n(j
′)
}
. (19)
Essentially, for each j, n(j) denotes the number of valuations equal to r(j) that should be picked
out when picking out the min{k,T} largest valuations. OPT is then equal to
∑m
j=1 r
(j)n(j).
Now consider the execution of the policy on this instance. For all j ∈ [m], if the random fixed
price P is equal to r(j), then the number of sales will be equal to min{
∑T
t=1 1(Vt≥ r
(j)), k}, which
by definition is equal to
∑m
j′=j n
(j′). Therefore,
E[ALG] =
1
q
m∑
j=1
q(j)r(j)
m∑
j′=j
n(j
′)
=
1
q
m∑
j′=1
n(j
′)
j′∑
j=1
(
1−
r(j−1)
r(j)
)
r(j)
=
1
q
m∑
j′=1
n(j
′)r(j
′)
which equals 1
q
OPT, completing the proof that the random fixed price is c∗(P)-competitive. 
It is known that correlated randomness is very powerful in the design of online algorithms (see,
e.g., Karp et al. (1990), who derive an extremely elegant solution to the online matching problem
using correlated randomness). Indeed, we can use our policy from Proposition 2 under our previous
models with more information on the valuations and still have a c∗(P)-competitive algorithm.
However, this is impractical for several reasons. First, the fact that the random price must be fixed
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makes it impossible to make use of additional information that may be available on the valuations
(this issue was also raised in Eren and Maglaras (2010)). Second, the random-fixed-price policy
does not show how the price should evolve as inventory is depleted, and does not satisfy the intuitive
structural property in dynamic pricing that the price is greater if the remaining inventory is less
(see Section 2.4). In Section 5, we show how our algorithms from Sections 2–3 can be adapted into
the setting where the personal information of each customer can be used in determining her price.
5. Personalization Revenue Management Model
In this section we consider the personalized online revenue management setup introduced by
Golrezaei et al. (2014), where:
• the stochastic decision of each customer can be modeled accurately upon her arrival to the
e-commerce platform (by using her characteristics);
• however, the overall intensity and characteristics of customers to arrive over time is difficult
to model (and treated as unknown/arbitrary).
In our model, this would correspond to the stochastic-valuation model in Section 3, with the change
that the distribution of each Vt is given before the algorithm has to set a price, instead of after.
The algorithms from Section 3 can still be applied, and will be c∗(P)-competitive. Furthermore,
it is not possible to be better than c∗(P)-competitive even with this personalized information, as
discussed in Section 1.1.
Nonetheless, in this section we specify how our online algorithms can exploit personalized infor-
mation to strictly improve their decisions, while remaining c∗(P)-competitive. Take any c∗(P)-
competitive algorithm A for the stochastic-valuation model (e.g. the algorithm from Section 3.2, or
a modification following Section 2.4 which never rejects customers before stocking out). For each
time step t and inventory level k′ > 0 such that Pr[IAt−1 = k
′]> 0, consider the distribution for the
price Pt chosen by algorithm A conditioned on I
A
t−1 = k
′ (this depends on the previously-observed
valuation distributions v1, . . . ,vt−1). Since now we also know the distribution vt of valuation Vt,
we can compute the probability of algorithm A making a sale during time t,
m∑
j=1
Pr[PAt = r
(j)|IAt−1 = k
′]Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)], (20)
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as well as its expected revenue,
m∑
j=1
r(j)Pr[PAt = r
(j)|IAt−1 = k
′]Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]. (21)
We can interpret (21) as the reward given to the algorithm during time t in exchange for the
probability (20) of consuming inventory. The price distribution used by the algorithm to obtain
such an exchange was chosen without knowing the distribution of Vt. However, since now we do
know the distribution of Vt, we can potentially make a decision which achieves more expected
reward under the same consumption probability. Specifically, we solve the following LP:
max
m∑
j=1
r(j)Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]pj(t, k
′)
s.t.
m∑
j=1
Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]pj(t, k
′) =
m∑
j=1
Pr[PAt = r
(j)|IAt−1 = k
′]Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)] (22)
m∑
j=1
pj(t, k
′)≤ 1
pj(t, k
′)≥ 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . ,m
pj(t, k
′) represents the probability that we should offer price j at time t, conditioned on the remain-
ing inventory being k′. We know that setting each pj(t, k
′) = Pr[PAt = r
(j)|IAt−1 = k
′] is a feasible
solution, and hence the optimal objective value of the optimization problem is at least (21). Let
{p∗j (t, k
′) : j =1, . . . ,m} denote an optimal solution to the optimization problem, for all t and k′.
Proposition 3. Consider the online algorithm which, at each time step t, sets the price randomly
according to probabilities {p∗j (t, k
′) : j = 1, . . . ,m}, where k′ is the remaining inventory at the start
of time t. Then for any sequence of valuation distributions v1, . . . ,vT , the algorithm’s total expected
revenue is at least EV1∼v1,...,VT ,∼vT [OPT(V1, . . . , VT )].
Proposition 3 is established in the same way as Theorems 2 and 4—for t = 1, . . . , T , we can
inductively ensure from constraint (22) that the distribution for the starting inventory level matches
that of A. Since the algorithm has the same distribution for inventory state at each time t and
earns at least as much revenue as A in expectation on every inventory state, its total revenue must
be at least the offline optimum (and in fact is often much better since it exploits personalization).
31
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a general solution to the single-leg revenue management problem
which yields the best-possible competitive ratio with limited demand information. Our policies
unify the inventory-dependent booking policies in Ball and Queyranne (2009) with the random
price-skimming policies in Eren and Maglaras (2010). An important feature of our policies is that
they show at each time step how the price distribution should depend on inventory when the future
is unknown, complementing classical results which show how the optimal price should depend on
inventory when the future is known. Our policies were derived using a new “valuation tracking”
technique, which geometrically tracks the optimum and hedges against the arrival sequence imme-
diately ending in the most inventory-conservative fashion. We believe this to be of general interest
for competitive ratio analysis.
Finally, we explain why our analysis of the pricing case, where each customer has a valuation
and chooses the lowest fare not exceeding it, captures all rational choice models. Suppose instead
that the firm could offer an assortment of fare classes, and that each customer has a ranked list of
fare classes she is willing to purchase, and chooses the highest-ranked fare class that is offered to
her. We can define Vt to be the maximum fare in the list that customer t is willing to purchase,
and then the offline optimum would still be the k largest values from V1, . . . , VT . Meanwhile, we
can modify the online algorithm so that whenever it would have offered price Pt, it now shows all
fares greater than or equal to Pt. This algorithm would still make a sale whenever Vt ≥Pt, except
now it has the opportunity to earn revenue greater than Pt, if customer t does not choose the
lowest offered fare. As a result, our c∗(P)-competitive algorithms under the pricing model imply
corresponding c∗(P)-competitive algorithms under the assortment model.
Nevertheless, we would like to end on two open questions related to the assortment generalization.
First, our argument above assumes rational choice models; however in practice certain fare classes
could be designed as “decoys” for other fare classes. Second, our algorithms imply an “assortment-
skimming” distribution over revenue-ordered assortments, but this assumes there is no limit on the
number of fare classes offered. We believe that assortment skimming under cardinality constraints
is an interesting problem.
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Appendix A: Full Proof of Theorem 1
Definition EC.1. Define the following:
• Si,t: the indicator random variable for whether inventory unit i is sold by the end of time t,
i.e. the value of sold[i] at the end of time t, defined for all i∈ [k] and t= 0, . . . , T ;
• it: the inventory unit assigned to customer t, taking a value in [k] for all t∈ [T ];
• ℓi,t: the value such that level[i] = r
(ℓi,t) at the end of time t, taking a value in {0,1, . . . ,m}
for all i ∈ [k] and t=0, . . . , T ;
• jt: the value in {0,1, . . . ,m} such that Vt = r
(jt), defined for all t∈ [T ].
Fix the deterministic sequence of valuations V1, . . . , VT chosen by the adversary. it, ℓi,t, and jt
are not random variables; they are determined by V1, . . . , VT .
We would like to write the random variables Si,t in terms of the other random variables. By
definition, Si,0 = 0 for all i∈ [k]. For t > 0, the following equations hold:
Sit,t = Sit,t−1+Xt; (EC.1)
Si,t = Si,t−1, for i 6= it. (EC.2)
(EC.1)–(EC.2) are easy to see. In the algorithm, the only inventory unit that could potentially
be sold during time t is it. This explains why (EC.2) holds for all i 6= it. It also explains why
Sit,t = 1 if and only if Sit,t−1 = 1 or Xt = 1. Furthermore, Sit,t−1 and Xt cannot both be 1, since
the algorithm does not try to sell inventory unit it again at time t if it has already been sold. This
completes the explanation for (EC.1).
We now analyze the state of the sold array during the execution of the algorithm.
Lemma EC.1. At the end of each time step t, the probability that any inventory unit i has been
sold is 1
q
∑ℓi,t
j=1 q
(j). Formally, for all t=0, . . . , T ,
E[Si,t] =
1
q
ℓi,t∑
j=1
q(j), for i∈ [k]. (EC.3)
Proof. We proceed by induction on t. (EC.3) is true at time t= 0, where E[Si,0] = 0 and ℓi,0 =0
for all i∈ [k].
Now suppose we are at the end of some time t > 0 and (EC.3) was true at the end of time t− 1.
We need to prove that (EC.3) is still true at the end of time t. For i 6= it, Si,t = Si,t−1, by (EC.2).
The value of level[i] is unchanged by the algorithm during time t, so ℓi,t = ℓi,t−1 as well. The
inductive hypothesis from time t− 1 then establishes that E[Si,t] =
1
q
∑ℓi,t
j=1 q
(j).
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It remains prove E[Sit,t] =
1
q
∑ℓit,t
j=1 q
(j). This is immediate if jt is no greater than ℓit,t−1 (the value
of the ℓ variable during iteration t of the algorithm), since both Si,t and ℓi,t would be unchanged.
If jt > ℓit,t−1, the following can be derived (let ℓ= ℓit,t−1 for brevity):
E[Sit,t] = E[Sit,t−1] +E[Xt]
= E[Sit,t−1] +E[Xt|Sit,t−1 =0] ·Pr[Sit,t−1 = 0]
=
1
q
ℓ∑
j=1
q(j)+Pr[Xt = 1|Sit,t−1 =0]
(
1−
1
q
ℓ∑
j=1
q(j)
)
=
1
q
ℓ∑
j=1
q(j)+
( jt∑
j=ℓ+1
q(j)∑m
j′=ℓ+1 q
(j′)
)(∑m
j=ℓ+1 q
(j)
q
)
=
1
q
jt∑
j=1
q(j).
The first equality follows from (EC.1) and the linearity of expectation. The second equality condi-
tions on Sit,t−1 being 0, since the value of Xt is 0 if Sit,t−1 = 1. The third equality uses the value of
E[Sit,t−1] guaranteed by the inductive hypothesis. In the fourth equality, the probability of getting
a sale, conditioned on Algorithm 1 reaching line 7, is equal to the probability of choosing a price
at most r(jt), the valuation of customer t. The final equality achieves the desired result because
jt = ℓit,t, the new value for level[i] after line 12 of iteration t of the algorithm.
This completes the induction and the proof of the lemma. 
Now we analyze the expected revenue of the algorithm, which is E[ALG], or
∑T
t=1E[PtXt]. As
argued earlier, there cannot be a sale in a time step t where jt ≤ ℓit,t−1, so for these time steps
Xt =0 and E[PtXt] = 0. The following lemma derives the value of E[PtXt] when jt > ℓit,t−1.
Lemma EC.2. Suppose jt > ℓit,t−1 in a time step t∈ [T ]. Then the expected revenue earned by the
algorithm during time step t is 1
q
(r(jt)− r(ℓit,t−1)).
Proof. Let t ∈ [T ] be any time step for which jt > ℓit,t−1. For brevity, let ℓ denote ℓit,t−1. The
following can be derived:
E[PtXt] = E[PtXt|Sit,t−1 = 0]Pr[Sit,t−1 =0]
=
( m∑
j=ℓ+1
r(j)E[Xt|Pt = r
(j)]Pr[Pt = r
(j)|Sit,t−1 = 0]
)(
1−Pr[Sit,t−1 = 1]
)
=
( m∑
j=ℓ+1
r(j)1[jt≥ j]Pr[Pt= r
(j)|Sit,t−1 = 0]
)(
1−
1
q
ℓ∑
j′=1
q(j
′)
)
=
( jt∑
j=ℓ+1
r(j)
q(j)∑m
j′=ℓ+1 q
(j′)
)(∑m
j′=ℓ+1 q
(j′)
q
)
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=
1
q
jt∑
j=ℓ+1
r(j)(1−
r(j−1)
r(j)
)
The first equality conditions on Sit,t−1 being 0; note that Xt = 0 if Sit,t−1 =1. The second equality
conditions on the value of Pt, where we drop the conditioning on Sit,t−1 in the term E[Xt|Pt= r
(j)]
since Pt 6=∞ already implies Sit,t−1 = 0. This term becomes 1[jt ≥ j] in the third equality, since
it is deterministically 1 or 0 depending on whether Vt ≥ r
(j), or equivalently jt ≥ j. The third
equality also uses Lemma EC.1, for the value of Pr[Sit,t−1 = 1]. The fourth equality uses the offering
probabilities from line 7 of Algorithm 1. The fifth equality uses the explicit definition of q(j) from
Definition 1, and it is easy to see that the final expression is equal to 1
q
(r(jt)− r(ℓ)). 
Lemma EC.2 in turn implies the following lemma.
Lemma EC.3. The expected revenue earned by the algorithm up to time t,
∑t
t′=1E[Pt′Xt′ ], is
1
q
∑k
i=1 r
(ℓi,t).
Proof. The customers up to time t can be partitioned according to the inventory unit they were
assigned, so
t∑
t′=1
E[Pt′Xt′ ] =
k∑
i=1
∑
t′≤t:it′=i
E[Pt′Xt′ ]. (EC.4)
Consider any i. For each t′ assigned to i, E[Pt′Xt′ ] is 0 if jt′ ≤ ℓi,t′−1. Denote the remaining t
′ such
that jt′ > ℓi,t′−1 by t
′
1, . . . , t
′
N , where N ≥ 0 and t
′
1 < . . . < t
′
N . Using Lemma EC.2,
∑
t′≤t:it′=i
E[Pt′Xt′ ] =
N∑
n=1
1
q
(r
(j
t′n
)
− r
(ℓ
i,t′n−1
)
).
Before time t′n, level[i] was last updated at time t
′
n−1, so ℓi,t′n−1 = jt′n−1. Therefore, the sum
telescopes and the remaining term is 1
q
r
(j
t′
N
)
(note that r
(ℓ
i,t′
1
−1
)
= r(0) = 0). Now, jt′
N
= ℓi,t′
N
,
and level[i] is not updated again in time steps t′N + 1, . . . , t, so ℓi,t′N = ℓi,t. Substituting∑
t′≤t:it′=i
E[Pt′Xt′ ] =
1
q
r(ℓi,t) into (EC.4) completes the proof. 
Having established the revenue of our online algorithm, we compare it to the offline optimum.
Knowing the sequence of valuations V1, . . . , VT in advance, it is clear that the following algorithm
is optimal:
1. Find the min{k,T} customers with the largest valuations;
2. Charge each of these customers t her maximum willingness-to-pay Vt;
3. Reject all other customers.
The revenue OPT would be the the sum of the min{k,T} largest valuations.
Definition EC.2. For all t∈ [T ], let Mk(t) be a vector consisting of the k largest elements from
(V1, . . . , Vt), in any order. If t < k, fill in the remaining entries of M
k(t) with zeros.
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Then OPT=
∑k
i=1M
k
i (T ), where M
k
i (T ) denotes the i’th entry of M
k(T ). It turns out that Mk(t)
is closely tracked by the level array from Algorithm 1, as t progresses from 1 to T . Both ℓi,t (the
value of level[i] at the end of time t) and Mk(t) are deterministic functions of V1, . . . , Vt.
Lemma EC.4. For all t= 0, . . . , T , the entries of the vector (r(ℓ1,t), . . . , r(ℓk,t)) is a permutation of
the entries of the vector Mk(t).
Proof. We proceed by induction on t. At time t = 0, both Mk(0) and (r(ℓ1,0), . . . , r(ℓk,0)) is a
vector of k zeros, so the statement is true.
Now consider t > 0, and suppose thatMk(t−1) is a permutation of (r(ℓ1,t−1), . . . , r(ℓk,t−1)). There-
fore, a minimum entry in Mk(t− 1) is equal to a minimum entry in (r(ℓ1,t−1), . . . , r(ℓk,t−1)), which
in turn is equal to r(ℓit,t−1), by Definition EC.1.
If jt > ℓit,t−1, or equivalently Vt = r
(jt) > r(ℓit,t−1), then by the definition of Mk(t), Vt must be
added to Mk(t− 1) and replace any minimum entry equal to r(ℓit,t−1). Meanwhile, ℓit,t = jt, and
ℓi,t = ℓi,t−1 for all i 6= it, thus the only change from (r
(ℓ1,t−1), . . . , r(ℓk,t−1)) to (r(ℓ1,t), . . . , r(ℓk,t)) is
that the entry at index it has been replaced by r
(jt). Since Mk(t− 1) and (r(ℓ1,t−1), . . . , r(ℓk,t−1)) go
through the same change at time t, Mk(t) is still a permutation of (r(ℓ1,t), . . . , r(ℓk,t)).
If instead jt ≤ ℓit,t−1, then every entry of M
k(t− 1) is already at least r(jt) = Vt, so M
k(t− 1)
incurs no change at time t. Similarly, ℓi,t = ℓi,t−1 for all i ∈ [k], so (r
(ℓ1,t−1), . . . , r(ℓk,t−1)) incurs no
change as well. In both cases, we have established thatMk(t) is a permutation of (r(ℓ1,t), . . . , r(ℓk,t)),
completing the induction and the proof. 
With Lemma EC.3 and Lemma EC.4, it is easy to establish the competitiveness of Algorithm 1.
Our online algorithm is designed so that during each time step t, it earns exactly 1
q
of the amount
that the offline optimum would increase by with the addition of Vt, and it does not need to observe
Vt beforehand to accomplish this.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix any sequence of valuations (V1, . . . , VT ). E[ALG] is equal to∑T
t=1E[PtXt], which in turn is equal to
1
q
∑k
i=1 r
(ℓi,T ), by Lemma EC.3. Meanwhile, OPT =∑k
i=1M
k
i (T ), and the entries of M
k(T ) is a permutation of the entries of (r(ℓ1,T ), . . . , r(ℓk,T )), by
Lemma EC.4. Therefore, OPT=
∑k
i=1 r
(ℓi,T ) = q ·E[ALG], completing the proof of Theorem 1. 
Appendix B: Proofs from Sections 2.3–2.4
Proof of Lemma 1. Let i= i∗t , for brevity. Let Si,t be the indicator random variable for inventory
unit i being sold by the end of time t. For all k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k},
Pr[Si,t−1 = 0|It−1 = k
′] =
Pr[It−1 = k
′|Si,t−1 = 0]Pr[Si,t−1 =0]
Pr[It−1 = k′|Si,t−1 = 0]Pr[Si,t−1 =0]+Pr[It−1 = k′|Si,t−1 =1]Pr[Si,t−1 =1]
(EC.5)
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by Bayes’ law. For all t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [k], and k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k}, we explain how to compute Pr[It−1 =
k′|Si,t−1 = 0] in polynomial time; Pr[It−1 = k
′|Si,t−1 = 1] can be computed analogously.
First we argue that the Bernoulli random variables {Si′,t−1 : i
′ ∈ [k]} are independent. To see this,
note that the assignment procedure in Algorithm 1 is deterministic. Therefore, each Si′,t−1 is only
dependent on the prices chosen for the customers assigned to i′, and while these prices could be
dependent on each other, they are independent from the prices chosen for customers not assigned
to i′.
Furthermore, It−1 = k −
∑k
i′=1 Si′,t−1. By independence, Pr[It−1 = k
′|Si,t−1 = 0] =
Pr[
∑
i′ 6=iSi′,t−1 = k − k
′].
∑
i′ 6=iSi′,t−1 is simply the sum of k − 1 independent Bernoulli random
variables with known mean (from Lemma EC.1), hence the probability that it equals a specific
value can be computed using dynamic programming.
We elaborate on the dynamic programming. For notational convenience, without loss of general-
ity assume i= k. We will inductively for a= 0, . . . , k− 1 maintain the value of Pr[
∑a
i′=1 Si′,t−1 = b]
for all b ∈ {0, . . . , k}. It is easy to initialize this for a = 0. Given Pr[
∑a
i′=1 Si′,t−1 = b] for all b ∈
{0, . . . , k}, note that
Pr[
a+1∑
i′=1
Si′,t−1 = b] = Pr[
a∑
i′=1
Si′,t−1 = b− 1]Pr[Sa+1,t−1 = 1]+Pr[
a∑
i′=1
Si′,t−1 = b]Pr[Sa+1,t−1 =0]
for all b ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Each iteration of a can be computed in time linear in k, and there are less
than k iterations.
Pr[It−1 = k
′|Si,t−1 = 1] can be computed analogously. It is clear that both procedures can be
done in time O(k2) (ignoring the O(t) time it may take to compute the assignment procedure),
completing the proof of Lemma 1. 
Proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 2. We argue that Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 are the special
cases of Lemma 4 and Theorem 4 from the stochastic-valuation model. It is easy to check that the
statements are analogous, so it suffices to show that Exp (as defined in Section 3.2) executed on
deterministic valuations is identical to Algorithm 1’ (as defined in Section 2.3).
We show that the decision rule for a single time period t, and any amount of inventory remaining
k′, is the same. Let i= i∗t and ℓ= ℓt, for brevity. Consider the values of i and ℓ during iteration t
of Algorithm 1 (with the deterministic valuations V1, . . . , VT ). First consider any j = ℓ+1, . . . ,m.
Pr[P A1
′
t = r
(j)|IA1
′
t−1 = k
′] = Pr[Si,t−1 = 0|I
A1
t−1 = k
′] ·
q(j)∑m
j′=ℓ+1 q
(j′)
=Pr[Si,t−1 = 0|I
A1
t−1 = k
′]Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|Si,t−1 =0, I
A1
t−1 = k
′]
= Pr[P A1t = r
(j) ∩Si,t−1 = 0|I
A1
t−1 = k
′]
= Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′]
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The first equality holds by the specification of algorithm Algorithm 1’. The second equality holds
by the specification of Algorithm 1, where we can add the conditioning on IA1t−1 = k
′ in the second
probability due to independence. The final equality follows because P A1t = r
(j) 6=∞ implies Si,t−1 =
0.
If j =m+1, then
Pr[P A1
′
t =∞|I
A1′
t−1 = k
′] = Pr[Si,t−1 = 1|I
A1
t−1 = k
′]
= Pr[P A1t =∞|I
A1
t−1 = k
′]
since the event Si,t−1 = 1 occurs if and only if the event P
A1
t =∞ occurs.
Finally, clearly if j ≤ ℓ, then both Pr[P A1
′
t = r
(j)|IA1
′
t−1 = k
′] and Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′] are 0.
We have shown that Pr[P A1
′
t = r
(j)|IA1
′
t−1 = k
′] = Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′] for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m,m+1},
so it is the same decision rule as Exp, completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix a valuation sequence V1, . . . , VT and consider any sample path in the
execution of A; let the sample path be depicted by the sequence of random prices PA1 , . . . , P
A
T . The
revenue ALGA on that sample path is given by
∑
t:Vt≥P
A
t
PAt ; note that the cardinality of the set
{t : Vt ≥ P
A
t } is at most k.
On that same sample path, the modified algorithm A′ would sell to the k customers with the
smallest indices in {t : Vt ≥ min{P
A
t , r
(m)}} (or all the customers in that set if its cardinality is
less than k). Let S denote the set of customers served by the modified algorithm. Let b = |{t ∈
S : PAt =∞}|, the number of customers with valuation r
(j) served by the modified algorithm that
were rejected by the original algorithm.
It is easy to see that
ALG
A′ −ALGA =
∑
t∈S
min{PAt , r
(m)}−
∑
t:Vt≥P
A
t
PAt
≥ br(m)−
∑
t∈S′
PAt (EC.6)
where S ′ is the set of customers that are no longer served by A′ because it used up b extra units
of inventory. Since |S ′| ≤ b, and PAt ≤ r
(m) for all t such that PAt ≤ Vt, it is immediate that (EC.6)
is non-negative. Since this holds on every sample path for A, we have completed the proof that
E[ALGA
′
]≥ E[ALGA]. 
Proof of Theorem 3 The inventory level It−1 is equal to k−
∑k
i=1(1−Si,t−1), where Si,t−1 is the
indicator random variable for inventory unit i being sold by the end of time t−1. We will hereafter
omit the subscript t− 1.
Each term (1−Si) is independent and equal to 1 with probability (
∑m
j=bi+1
)q(j)/q, which is the
probability that inventory unit i has not been sold. We will denote it using pi and let Yi = 1−Si,
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for brevity. As long as bi (the index in 0, . . . ,m of the highest valuation assigned to inventory unit
i) is not 0 or m, pi ∈ (0,1). We will without loss of generality assume that pi ∈ (0,1) for all i,
redefining k and re-indexing as necessary (if pi = 0 or pi = 1 then Yi is deterministic and we can
remove it from analysis of the random sum). By the assumptions in the statement of the theorem,
this re-indexing does not cause i∗t to fall outside of 1, . . . , k; in fact we can without loss of generality
assume i∗t =1. Furthermore, k1, k2 are at least 0 at at most the re-defined k, since they correspond
to inventory levels that are realized with non-zero probability.
After all of these transformations, the statement reduces to
Pr[Y1 = 1|
k∑
i=1
Yi = k1]<Pr[Y1 = 1|
k∑
i=1
Yi = k2] (EC.7)
where each Yi is an independent Bernoulli random variable of probability pi ∈ (0,1) and 0≤ k1 <
k2≤ k. Furthermore, we can without loss of generality assume that k2 = k1+1.
If k1 = 0, then (EC.7) is clearly true, since the LHS is 0 while the RHS is non-zero. So assume
that k1 > 0 and we can rewrite (EC.7) as follows:
Pr[Y1 =1∩
∑k
i=1 Yi = k1]
Pr[
∑k
i=1 Yi = k1]
<
Pr[Y1 = 1∩
∑k
i=1 Yi = k1+1]
Pr[
∑k
i=1 Yi = k1+1]
p1Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1− 1]
p1Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1− 1]+ (1− p1)Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1]
<
p1Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1]
p1Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1] + (1− p1)Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1+1](
1+
(1− p1)
p1
·
Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1]
Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1− 1]
)−1
<
(
1+
(1− p1)
p1
·
Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1+1]
Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1]
)−1
Therefore, it suffices to prove that:
Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1]
Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1− 1]
>
Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1+1]
Pr[
∑k
i=2 Yi = k1]
Pr[
k∑
i=2
Yi = k1]
2 >Pr[
k∑
i=2
Yi = k1+1]Pr[
k∑
i=2
Yi = k1− 1]

 ∑
S⊆{2,...,k}:|S|=k1
∏
i∈S
pi
∏
i/∈S
(1− pi)


2
>

 ∑
S:|S|=k1+1
∏
i∈S
pi
∏
i/∈S
(1− pi)



 ∑
S:|S|=k1−1
∏
i∈S
pi
∏
i/∈S
(1− pi)


(EC.8)
After expanding, both sides are a sum of terms of the form
k∏
i=2
paii (1− pi)
2−ai (EC.9)
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where each ai is 0, 1, or 2 and the sum
∑k
i=2 ai equals 2k1, the total number of times that a
“positive” term pi (as opposed to a “negative” term (1− pi)) appears in the product. Let b denote
the total number of i= 2, . . . , k such that ai = 1, which must be even.
Now, observe that the total number of times the term (EC.9) appears in the LHS of the expansion
of (EC.8) is
(
b
b/2
)
(because we choose b/2 of the b indices that are “positive” to come from the
first bracket; the remaining b/2 must come from the second bracket) while the total number of
times this term appears in the RHS is
(
b
b/2+1
)
(because we choose b/2+1 of the b indices that are
“positive” to come from the first bracket), with the latter being strictly less. Furthermore, none of
these terms are 0, since all of the values of pi lie strictly between 0 and 1. Therefore, the inequality
is strict, completing the proof of the theorem. 
Appendix C: Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 4. We proceed by induction on t. (7) is true for t = 0, since Pr[IExp0 = k] =
Pr[IA10 = k] = 1.
Now suppose t > 0 and that (7) has been established for time t− 1. Then for every k′ such that
Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′]> 0, (6) holds by definition. Indeed, since Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′] = Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′] by the inductive
hypothesis, Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′]> 0 for such k′.
We now consider (7) for time t. Note that IExpt = I
Exp
t−1−1(Vt≥ P
Exp
t ). Therefore,
Pr[IExpt = k
′] = Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′+1∩Vt ≥P
Exp
t ] +Pr[I
Exp
t−1 = k
′ ∩Vt <P
Exp
t ] (EC.10)
for k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1}, while
Pr[IExpt = k] = Pr[I
Exp
t−1 = k∩Vt <P
Exp
t ]. (EC.11)
Now, for any k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k}, if Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′]> 0, then the following can be derived:
Pr[Vt ≥P
Exp
t |I
Exp
t−1 = k
′]
=
m+1∑
j=1
Pr[Vt ≥ P
Exp
t |P
Exp
t = r
(j), IExpt−1 = k
′]Pr[P Expt = r
(j)|IExpt−1 = k
′]
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=
m+1∑
j=1
Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]Pr[P Expt = r
(j)|IExpt−1 = k
′]
=
m+1∑
j=1
Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]Pr[P A1t = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′]
= Pr[Vt ≥P
A1
t |I
A1
t−1 = k
′]. (EC.12)
In the second equality, we remove the conditioning on IExpt−1 = k
′, since the valuation Vt is an
independent random variable unaffected by any history. The third equality follows because we have
already established (6) for time t. The final equality also requires independence.
By the inductive hypothesis that (7) holds for time t−1, Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′] = Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′]. If Pr[IExpt−1 =
k′] is also non-zero, then the following can be derived using (EC.12):
Pr[Vt ≥ P
Exp
t |I
Exp
t−1 = k
′]Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′] = Pr[Vt ≥P
A1
t |I
A1
t−1 = k
′]Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′]
Pr[Vt ≥ P
Exp
t ∩ I
Exp
t−1 = k
′] = Pr[Vt ≥P
A1
t ∩ I
A1
t−1 = k
′]. (EC.13)
If instead Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′] = Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′] = 0, then Pr[Vt ≥ P
Exp
t ∩ I
Exp
t−1 = k
′]≤ Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′] = 0. Simi-
larly, Pr[Vt ≥P
A1
t ∩ I
A1
t−1 = k
′] = 0, and therefore, (EC.13) still holds.
We can analogously to (EC.12) and (EC.13) derive for all k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k} that
Pr[Vt <P
Exp
t ∩ I
Exp
t−1 = k
′] = Pr[Vt <P
A1
t ∩ I
A1
t−1 = k
′]. (EC.14)
We can substitute (EC.13) and (EC.14) into (EC.10) to see that
Pr[IExpt = k
′] = Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′+1∩Vt ≥P
A1
t ] +Pr[I
A1
t−1 = k
′ ∩Vt <P
A1
t ]
= Pr[
t−1∑
t′=1
XA1t′ = k− k
′− 1∩XA1t = 1]+Pr[
t−1∑
t′=1
XA1t′ = k− k
′ ∩XA1t =0]
= Pr[IA1t = k
′]
for all k′ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. We can similarly substitute (EC.14) into (EC.11) to see that Pr[IExpt =
k] = Pr[IA1t = k]. This completes the induction and the proof of Lemma 4. 
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Proof of Theorem 4. The following is straight-forward to derive:
E[ALGExp] =
T∑
t=1
E[P Expt ·1(Vt ≥P
Exp
t )]
=
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
r(j)Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]Pr[P Expt = r
(j)]
=
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
r(j)Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]
k∑
k′=0
Pr[P Expt = r
(j)|IExpt−1 = k
′]Pr[IExpt−1 = k
′]
=
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
r(j)Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]
k∑
k′=0
Pr[P A1T = r
(j)|IA1t−1 = k
′]Pr[IA1t−1 = k
′]
=
T∑
t=1
m+1∑
j=1
r(j)Pr[Vt ≥ r
(j)]Pr[P A1t = r
(j)]
=
T∑
t=1
E[P A1t ·1(Vt ≥P
A1
t )].
The second and sixth equalities use the independence of Vt, while the fourth equality uses both
statements of Lemma 4. The final expression is equal to E[ALGA1], completing the proof of Theo-
rem 4. 
Proof of Lemma 5. The first statement is easy to see. Since every sample path fails at time
T + 1 by definition, for any sample path HSampT , it must have a unique first point of failure in
[T +1], say t′. HSampT then falls under exactly one of the events, namely the one with t= t
′ and ht =
(0, P Samp1 , V
Samp
1 , . . . ,0, P
Samp
t−1 , V
Samp
t−1 ,1). Therefore, the events are mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive. The case for Exp is argued analogously.
The final statement is argued inductively. For all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, let gt = (f1, p1, v1, . . . , ft, pt, vt)
be a vector of realizations to the end of time t, and let Gt denote the set of such vectors containing
no failures. Let GSampt = (F
Samp
1 , P
Samp
1 , V
Samp
1 , . . . , F
Samp
t , P
Samp
t , V
Samp
t ), and
G
Exp
t = (F
Exp
1 , P
Exp
1 , V
Exp
1 , . . . , F
Exp
t , P
Exp
t , V
Exp
t ).
We would like to inductively establish that Pr[GSampt = gt] = Pr[G
Exp
t = gt] for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T}
and gt ∈ Gt. This is clearly true for t= 0. For t > 0, take any gt ∈ Gt, and we can write
Pr[GSampt = gt] = Pr[G
Samp
t−1 = gt−1] ·Pr[F
Samp
t =0|G
Samp
t−1 = gt=1] ·Pr[P
Samp
t = pt|G
Samp
t−1 = gt=1, F
Samp
t = 0]
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·Pr[V Sampt = vt|G
Samp
t−1 = gt=1, F
Samp
t = 0, P
Samp
t = pt];
Pr[Gexpt = gt] = Pr[G
exp
t−1 = gt−1] ·Pr[F
Exp
t = 0|G
exp
t−1 = gt=1] ·Pr[P
Exp
t = pt|G
exp
t−1 = gt=1, F
Exp
t = 0]
·Pr[V Expt = vt|G
exp
t−1 = gt=1, F
Exp
t = 0, P
Exp
t = pt].
We will prove that Pr[GSampt = gt] = Pr[G
Exp
t = gt] by arguing that each term in the expression for
Pr[GSampt = gt] equals the corresponding term in the expression for Pr[G
Exp
t = gt]. The first terms
are equal because of the inductive hypothesis. The second terms are equal because both algorithms
are sampling runs of Algorithm 1 and trying to hit a run with IA1t−1 = k −
∑t−1
t′=1 1(vt′ ≥ pt′). The
third terms are identical because because we have conditioned on F Sampt = 0. The fourth terms are
equal because V Sampt and V
Exp
t are IID and none of the conditioning has any effect.
Having established this, note that for every t∈ [T+1] and ht ∈Ft there exists a unique gt−1 ∈ Gt−1
such that gt−1 is a prefix of ht. We know that for this gt−1, Pr[G
Samp
t−1 = gt−1] = Pr[G
Exp
t−1 = gt−1].
Therefore, it suffices to prove that Pr[F Sampt = 0|G
Samp
t−1 = gt−1] = Pr[F
Exp
t = 0|G
Exp
t−1 = gt−1]. By the
same argument as the previous paragraph, these two probabilities are equal. Therefore, Pr[HSamp =
ht] = Pr[H
Exp = ht], completing the proof of Lemma 5. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Applying Lemma 7 to (15), we see that
E[ALGSamp] ≥ E[ALGExp]−E[OPT]
( T∑
t=1
1
eCt2
)
≥ E[ALGExp]−E[OPT]
1
e⌈ 6
eπ2ε
⌉
(π2
6
)
≥ E[ALGExp]− ε ·E[OPT]
Furthermore, we know from Theorem 4 that E[ALGExp] =E[ALGA1] = 1
q
E[OPT]. This establishes the
competitiveness.
The statement about runtime also follows easily from the specification of Algorithm 2 since the
number of sample runs during each time period t, ⌈ 6
eπ2ε
⌉(k+1)t2, is polynomial in 1
ε
. 
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Algorithm 3: Weakly Randomized Online Algorithm for Continuum of Prices
Input: Customers t= 1,2, . . . arriving online, with each valuation Vt revealed after the price
Pt is chosen.
Output: For each customer t, a (possibly random) price Pt for her.
1 val[i] = 0,sold[i] = false for i= 1, . . . , k;
2 t= 1;
3 while customer t arrives do
4 v =mini′{val[i
′]};
5 i=min{i′ : val[i′] = v};
6 if sold[i] = false then
7 if v=0 then
8 offer price 1 w.p. 1
1+lnR
, and price r w.p. 1
r(1+lnR)
for all r ∈ (1,R];
9 else
10 offer price r w.p. 1
r(lnR−lnv)
for all r ∈ (v,R];
11 end
12 else
13 reject the customer by choosing price ∞;
14 end
15 observe valuation Vt and purchase decision Xt;
16 if Vt > v then
17 val[i] = Vt;
18 if Xt =1 then
19 sold[i] = true;
20 end
21 end
22 t= t+1;
23 end
Appendix D: A Continuum of Prices
In this section we show how to modify Algorithm 1 for the setting where valuations could take any
value in 0∪ [1,R]. The competitive ratio obtained will be 1
1+lnR
, recovering the competitive ratio
from Ball and Queyranne (2009).
Consider Algorithm 3. Now val[i] keeps track of the highest valuation assigned to inventory unit
i thus far, starting at 0. It is easy to check that the price distributions specified in lines 8 and 10
are proper.
To analyze the competitiveness of Algorithm 3, we prove lemmas analogous to Lemmas EC.1–
EC.2. We use the same notation as in Definition EC.1, except instead of ℓi,t and jt, we use vi,t to
denote the value of val[i] at the end of time t, taking a value in 0∪ [1,R].
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Lemma EC.5. At the end of each time step t, the probability that any inventory unit i has been
sold is 0 if vi,t = 0, and
1+lnvi,t
1+lnR
if vi,t ≥ 1. Formally, for all t= 0, . . . , T ,
E[Si,t] = 1(vi,t> 0) ·
1+ ln vi,t
1+ lnR
, for i∈ [k]. (EC.15)
Proof. We proceed by induction on t. (EC.15) is true at time t=0, where E[Si,0] = 0 and vi,0 =0
for all i∈ [k].
Now suppose we are at the end of some time t > 0 and (EC.15) was true at the end of time
t−1. It suffices to prove that E[Sit,t] = 1(vit,t > 0) ·
1+lnvit,t
1+lnR
. This is immediate if Vt ≤ vit,t−1, by the
induction hypothesis. Otherwise, if Vt >vit,t−1, we consider two cases. Let v= vit,t−1 for brevity.
We know that E[Sit,t] =E[Sit,t−1] +E[Xt|Sit,t−1 = 0] ·Pr[Sit,t−1 =0].
If v= 0, then this equals
Pr[Xt = 1|Sit,t−1 =0] =
1
1+ lnR
(1+
∫ vi,t
1
1
r
dr)
=
1+ ln vi,t
1+ lnR
as desired. On the other hand, if v > 0, then
E[Sit,t] =
1+ ln v
1+ lnR
+
1
lnR− ln v
∫ vi,t
v
1
r
dr
(
1−
1+ ln v
1+ lnR
)
=
1+ ln v
1+ lnR
+
ln vi,t− lnv
lnR− ln v
( lnR− ln v
1+ lnR
)
=
1+ ln vi,t
1+ lnR
.
This completes the induction and the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma EC.6. Suppose Vt = vit,t > vit,t−1 in a time step t∈ [T ]. Then the expected revenue earned
by the algorithm during time step t is 1
1+lnR
(vit,t− vit,t−1).
Proof. Let t ∈ [T ] be any time step for which Vt > vit,t−1. Again, let v denote ℓit,t−1, and we
consider the two cases v= 0 and v > 0. If v =0, then
E[PtXt] =
1
1+ lnR
(
1+
∫ R
1
rE[Xt|Pt = r]
1
r
dr
)
=
1
1+ lnR
(
1+
∫ R
1
1[vit,t≥ r]dr
)
=
1
1+ lnR
(1+ vit,t− 1).
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In the first equality, a sale is guaranteed if Pt= 1, earning revenue 1. The final term is the desired
expression.
If v > 0, then
E[PtXt] =
1
lnR− lnv
(∫ R
v
rE[Xt|Pt = r]
1
r
dr
)( lnR− lnv
1+ lnR
)
=
1
1+ lnR
(∫ R
v
1[vit,t ≥ r]dr
)
=
1
1+ lnR
(vit,t− v)
as desired. 
With these two lemmas, the rest of the proof follows Section A. Indeed, Lemma EC.3 says
that E[ALG] = 1
1+lnR
∑k
i=1 vi,T . Meanwhile, Lemma EC.4 says that OPT =
∑k
i=1 vi,T . Therefore,
E[ALG]
OPT
≥ 1
1+lnR
, and since V1, . . . , VT was arbitrary, Algorithm 3 is
1
1+lnR
-competitive.
Appendix E: Upper Bounds on the Competitive Ratio relative to the DLP
First, it is well-known that the DLP overestimates the optimum by a factor of 1− 1
e
, even when the
feasible price set P consists of a singleton (i.e. the dynamic pricing problem is trivial because there
is only one price to choose from). The example requires the starting inventory k to be 1. Without
loss of generality assume P = {1}. Consider T customers, each of whom have a valuation exceeding
1 with probability 1
T
, and a valuation of 0 otherwise. It is easy to check that OPTLP = 1 in this
case, by setting x
(1)
t = 1 for all t ∈ [T ]. Meanwhile, any algorithm cannot have expected revenue
exceeding 1− (1− 1
T
)T , where we have subtracted from 1 the probability of all customers having
valuation 0. As T →∞,
E[ALG]
OPTLP
approaches 1−
1
e
.
However, the gap becomes even larger if P contains more than one price. We illustrate in the
case of two feasible prices.
Lemma EC.7. Consider the stochastic-valuation model defined in Section 3, and let P = {1, r},
k= 1. For all r≥ 1, there exists a distribution over v1, . . . ,vT such that for any online algorithm,
E[ALG(v1, . . . ,vT )]
E[OPTLP(v1, . . . ,vT )]
≤min{1−
1
e
,
r− r/e
2r− 1− r/e
}. (EC.16)
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If r≤ 1
1−1/e
, then the RHS of (EC.16) is equal to 1− 1
e
≈ .632. However, if r > 1
1−1/e
, then we show
that the upper bound is r−r/e
2r−1−r/e
, which decreases to e−1
2e−1
≈ .387 as r→∞.
Proof. Suppose that r > 1
1−1/e
, and let p = 1
r(1−1/e)
, which is in (0,1). Consider the following
distribution over v1, . . . ,vT :
• The first valuation distribution is deterministically v1 = (v
(0)
1 , v
(1)
1 , v
(2)
1 ) = (0,1,0), i.e. the first
customer deterministically has valuation 1.
• With probability p, valuation distributions v2, . . . ,vT are all equal to (1−
1
T−1
,0, 1
T−1
). When
this occurs, each of the T − 1 customers 2, . . . , T are willing to pay r with probability 1
T−1
,
and 0 otherwise.
• With probability 1− p, valuation distributions v2, . . . ,vT are all equal to (1,0,0). When this
occurs, all customers 2, . . . , T will never make a purchase.
We first compute the expected value of OPTLP(v1, . . . ,vT ). With probability 1 − p,
OPTLP(v1, . . . ,vT ) = 1, setting x
(1)
1 = 1. With probability p, OPTLP(v1, . . . ,vT ) = r, setting x
(1)
1 =
x
(2)
1 = 0 and x
(2)
2 = . . .= x
(2)
T = 1. Therefore, E[OPTLP(v1, . . . ,vT )] = 1− p+ pr.
We now consider the optimal strategy for the online algorithm. It has to decide, at time 1,
whether to sell the only unit of inventory at price 1, without knowing whether v2, . . . ,vT are equal to
(1− 1
T−1
,0, 1
T−1
) or (1,0,0). Conditioned on it deciding to sell, ALG(v1, . . . ,vT ) is deterministically
1. Conditioned on it deciding to wait, ALG(v1, . . . ,vT ) is r with probability
1
r(1− 1/e)
· (1− (1−
1
T − 1
)T−1), (EC.17)
and 0 otherwise.
We explain (EC.17). If the online algorithm decides to wait, then it will offer price r to all
customers beyond the first. It gets a sale if v2 = . . . = vT = (1−
1
T−1
,0, 1
T−1
), which occurs with
probability p= 1
r(1−1/e)
, and further if at least 1 of the valuations V2, . . . , VT realizes to r, which
yields the second term in (EC.17).
Thus the expected revenue from deciding to wait is (EC.17) multiplied by r, or
1
(1− 1/e)
· (1− (1−
1
T − 1
)T−1), (EC.18)
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which is always greater than 1. Therefore, the online algorithm is better off waiting, in which case
its expected revenue is (EC.18). Taking T →∞, (EC.18) approaches 1.
As T →∞, the distribution we constructed over v1, . . . ,vT is such that for the best online
algorithm,
E[ALG(v1, . . . ,vT )]
E[OPTLP(v1, . . . ,vT )]
=
1
1− p+ pr
=
r(1− 1/e)
r(1− 1/e)− 1+ r
=
r− r/e
2r− 1− r/e
,
as desired. 
